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The classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell paradigm states that trade and capital mobility are substitutes,
in the sense that trade integration reduces the incentives for capital to flow to capital-scarce countries.
In this paper we show that in a world with heterogeneous financial development, the classic conclusion
does not hold. In particular, in less financially developed economies (South), trade and capital mobility
are complements. Within a dynamic framework, the complementarity carries over to (financial) capital
flows. This interaction implies that deepening trade integration in South raises net capital inflows (or
reduces net capital outflows). It also implies that, at the global level, protectionism may backfire if
the goal is to rebalance capital flows, when these are already heading from South to North. Our perspective
also has implications for the effects of trade integration on factor prices. In contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin
















The process of globalization involves the integration of goods and ￿nancial markets of heterogeneous
economies. While these two dimensions of integration are deeply intertwined in practice, the
economics literature has kept them largely separate. International trade deals with the former
while macroeconomics with the latter. In this paper we argue that such separation is not warranted
when ￿nancial frictions are an important source of heterogeneity across countries and sectors.
In particular, we show that in this context trade and net capital ￿ ows are complements in less
￿nancially developed economies. A ￿nancially underdeveloped economy that opens the capital
account without liberalizing trade is likely to experience capital out￿ ows. An aggressive trade
liberalization can reverse these out￿ ows. At the global level, a rise in protectionism may exacerbate
rather than reduce the so called ￿global imbalances.￿
While some of these implications may resonate with practitioners, they are in stark contrast with
those that follow from the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell paradigm (HOM). In the neoclassical
two-good, two-factor model, provided that a small open economy produces both goods, free trade
brings about factor price equalization (FPE) with the rest of the world. When this happens,
international capital mobility becomes irrelevant. By the same token, if a capital-scarce small open
economy sets a tari⁄ on its import sector, it triggers a capital in￿ ow to the point at which FPE is
restored. In sum, in HOM trade and capital in￿ ows are substitutes: trade integration reduces the
incentives for capital to ￿ ow to capital-scarce countries.
The key di⁄erence between our model and the HOM one, aside from the dynamic aspects that
allow us to talk about ￿nancial ￿ ows rather than just physical capital mobility, is the presence
of ￿nancial frictions. Motivated by the ￿ndings of King and Levine (1993), Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Manova (2007), and many others, we highlight two dimensions
of heterogeneity in ￿nancial frictions. First, there is cross-country heterogeneity. The ability to
pledge future output to potential ￿nanciers is higher in rich ￿North￿than in developing ￿South.￿
Second, there is cross-sectoral heterogeneity. Even when operating under a common ￿nancial
system, producers in certain sectors ￿nd it more problematic to obtain ￿nancing than producers
in others sectors. Paraphrasing Rajan and Zingales (1998), some sectors are more ￿dependent￿on
￿nancial infrastructure than others. In this context, both trade and capital ￿ ows become market
mechanisms to circumvent the misallocation of capital induced by ￿nancial frictions in South. If
we close the trade channel, then both physical and ￿nancial capital out￿ ows from South become
the vehicle through which the return to savers and the sectoral allocation of capital are improved
in South. In contrast, with free trade, it is the reorganization of domestic production in South that
does the heavy-lifting, and by doing so raises the return on capital in South and palliates or even
reverses capital out￿ ows. Intuitively, international trade allows for an allocation of factors across
sectors that is (partially) detached from local demand conditions and this allows Southern capital
to work with more labor in the sector with lower ￿nancial frictions.
In order to formalize these insights, in section 2 we develop a standard 2￿2 general equilibrium
model of international trade in which ￿rms hire capital and labor to produce homogenous goods
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in the simplest possible way, we enrich the standard model by incorporating a ￿nancial market
imperfection in one of the sectors. This friction limits the amount of capital allocated to the sector
a⁄ected by it.
We ￿rst consider the autarkic equilibrium of this simple economy in which goods and factor
markets have to clear domestically. In such a case, countries with worse ￿nancial institutions
feature a lower relative price of the unconstrained sector￿ s output (since a disproportionate share
of resources ends up being allocated to this sector) and also feature relatively depressed wages and
returns to capital. If we now allow capital to move across countries that di⁄er only in ￿nancial
development, capital ￿ ows from the ￿nancially underdeveloped South to the ￿nancially developed
North.
These closed (to trade) economy outcomes are in sharp contrast to those when South can freely
trade with a ￿nancially developed North. We show that in that case South specializes in the uncon-
strained sector and thus becomes a net importer of the output of the ￿￿nancial dependent￿sector.
From the point of view of South, trade integration raises the relative price of the unconstrained
sector￿ s output and the real return to capital. Trade does not bring about factor price equalization
and the rate of return to capital ends up being higher in South than in North. This ￿overshooting￿
follows from the fact that in the free trade equilibrium North produces a disproportionate amount
of output in an industry (the ￿nancially dependent one) where capital intensity is suboptimal. It
follows that the residual capital-labor ratio available to the unconstrained sector is larger in North
than in South, and this makes the return to capital higher in South. The counterpart of this result
is that workers in South produce with relatively less capital in the unconstrained sector, and thus
wages remain lower in South than in North.
Although we initially derive our conclusions for the case in which South is a small open economy
and preferences and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, we later demonstrate that the complementarity
between trade and return to capital (and hence capital mobility) is fully general. In particular, in
a world in which countries di⁄er only in ￿nancial development and sectors di⁄er only in ￿nancial
dependence, trade integration reduces the gap between the real return to capital in North and South,
and with free trade, the real return to capital is higher in the less ￿nancially developed South. In
section 3, we characterize the equilibrium with capital mobility and show that the complementarity
between trade and net capital in￿ ows works in both directions, in the sense that Northern capital
￿ ows to the unconstrained sector in South and increases trade ￿ ows between countries.
All the statements up to now follow from a static model where the only possible type of capital
￿ ows involve movements of physical capital across countries. In section 4 we develop a dynamic
model that illustrates that our mechanism has similar implications for ￿nancial capital ￿ ows (that
is, for ￿ ows of ownership claims). In doing so, we build on the overlapping-generations framework
developed by Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006). Under the plausible assumption that neither
labor income nor entrepreneurial rents are capitalizable, our model implies that countries with
underdeveloped ￿nancial markets feature relatively low interest rates under trade and ￿nancial
3autarky, but relatively high interest rates with free trade and ￿nancial autarky. It follows that,
again, trade and ￿nancial capital in￿ows are complements in South.
Our benchmark model isolates the e⁄ects of cross-country and cross-sectoral heterogeneity in
￿nancial frictions on the structure of trade and capital ￿ ows. In section 5, we introduce Heckscher-
Ohlin determinants of international trade into our static model. We focus on the empirically
relevant case in which the ￿nancially underdeveloped South is also relatively capital scarce and the
constrained sector features a higher elasticity of output with respect to capital than the uncon-
strained sector. Under these circumstances, we show that our main results go through and often
are reinforced. Furthermore, regardless of relative factor endowment di⁄erences and relative factor
intensity di⁄erences, our model always generates a decrease in the Southern wage-rental ratio after
trade liberalization: an anti-Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ect.
Our paper relates to several literatures in international ￿nance and international trade. From
the point of view of international ￿nance, the closest models are those studying the role of ￿nancial
frictions in shaping capital ￿ ows. These models are typically cast in terms of one-sector models,
where capital ￿ ows is the only mechanism to increase the return to capital in ￿nancially underdevel-
oped countries. The literature highlighting this mechanism is large and includes Gertler and Rogo⁄
(1990), Boyd and Smith (1997), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004), Kraay
et al. (2005), as well as the more recent (working) papers by Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas
(2006), Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2006), and Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007). There
is also a trade literature emphasizing the role of the interaction between ￿nancial development and
￿nancial dependence in shaping international trade ￿ ows. It includes the work of Bardhan and
Kletzer (1987), Beck (2002), Matsuyama (2005), Wynne (2005), Ju and Wei (2006), and Manova
(2007). These papers, however, focus on deriving (and testing) implications for trade ￿ ows and
do not allow for capital mobility. In terms of complementarities between trade and capital ￿ ows,
our paper shares with Markusen (1983) who shows that our second level of complementarity (from
capital mobility to trade ￿ ows) can be derived in a variety of models in which comparative advan-
tage is not driven by di⁄erences in capital-labor ratios across countries. In our paper, we focus on
the ￿rst type of complementarity going from trade integration to capital mobility, which is absent
in his framework. Another di⁄erence between Markusen (1983) and our paper is that he did not
explore the role of ￿nancial frictions, which are of course central in our context. Finally, in terms
of comparative statics, our extended model with Heckscher-Ohlin elements have some similarities
with the speci￿c-factors model of Jones (1971) and Samuelson (1971). Although uninformed cap-
ital is not speci￿c to the unconstrained sector, its allocation across sectors is pinned down by the
parameters governing the tightness of the ￿nancial constraint. Amano (1977), Brecher and Findlay
(1983), Jones (1989) and Neary (1995) study capital mobility within variants of the speci￿c-factors
model, but the conclusions generally depend on the assumed pattern of specialization and factor
mobility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop our benchmark 2￿2 model
of ￿nancial frictions and compare the autarky and free trade equilibria. In section 3, we derive and
4discuss our main result on the complementarity between trade ￿ ows and capital mobility. In section
4, we develop a dynamic version of our model that generalizes our complementarity result to the
link between trade ￿ ows and ￿nancial capital ￿ ows. In section 5, we enrich the static model by
incorporating Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of comparative advantage into the analysis. In section
6, we o⁄er some concluding remarks.
2 A Stylized Model of Trade with Financial Frictions
In this section we develop our benchmark model. In order to isolate the main mechanism in the
paper, we make a series of simplifying assumptions that we later relax sequentially. In particular,
our benchmark model imposes a speci￿c log-linear structure and abstracts from standard Heckscher-
Ohlin determinants of comparative advantage.
2.1 The Environment
Consider an economy that employs two factors (capital K and labor L) to produce two goods
(1 and 2). The country is inhabited by a continuum of measure ￿ of entrepreneurs (or informed
capitalists), a continuum of measure 1￿￿ of uninformed capitalists, and a continuum of measure L
of workers. All capitalists are endowed with K units of capital and each worker supplies inelastically
one unit of labor, so the aggregate capital-labor ratio of the economy is K=L, with a fraction ￿ of
K being ￿informed￿capital and the remaining fraction being ￿uninformed￿capital.
All agents have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences and devote a fraction ￿ of their spending to










Production in both sectors combines capital and labor according to:
Yi = Z (Ki)
￿ (Li)
1￿￿ , i = 1;2, (2)
where Ki and Li are the amounts of capital employed in sector i and Z is a Hicks-neutral produc-
tivity parameter. From a technological point of view, informed and uninformed capital are perfect
substitutes. Notice also that, for the time being, we focus on symmetric technologies to eliminate
any source of comparative advantage other than ￿nancial development.
Goods and labor markets are perfectly competitive, and factors of production are freely mobile
across sectors. If the capital market is also perfectly competitive, then the autarky equilibrium of
this economy is straightforward to characterize. In particular, given identical technologies in both
sectors, the marginal rate of transformation is equal to ￿1 and thus the relative price of sector 2￿ s
output, p, is equal to 1. It is then easily veri￿ed that the economy allocates a fraction ￿ of K and
L to sector 1, and the remaining fraction 1 ￿ ￿ to sector 2. If this frictionless economy is open to
5international trade and faces an exogenously given relative price p, then it completely specializes
in sector 1 if p < 1 and completely specializes in sector 2 if p > 1.
2.2 Financial Friction
We shall assume, however, that the capital market has a friction. Consistently with the empirical
literature discussed in the introduction, we assume that the ￿nancial friction has an asymmetric
e⁄ect in the two sectors. To simplify matters, we assume that ￿nancial contracting in sector 2 is
perfect in the sense that producers in that sector can hire any desired amount of capital at the
equilibrium rental rate, which we denote by ￿.
Conversely, there is a ￿nancial friction in sector 1, which we associate with the production
process in that sector as being relatively ￿complex.￿We appeal to this complexity to justify the
following two assumptions: (i) that only entrepreneurs know how to produce in sector 1 (i.e., their
￿human capital￿is essential), and (ii) that because of informational frictions, producers in that
sector (i.e., entrepreneurs) can only borrow a limited amount of capital. We capture the latter
capital market friction in a stark (though standard in the literature) way by assuming that lenders
are only willing to lend to entrepreneurs a multiple ￿ ￿1 of the entrepreneur￿ s capital endowment,
so their investment is constrained by
I ￿ ￿K; for ￿ > 1. (3)
For the purposes of this paper we need not take a particular stance on what is the friction behind
this borrowing constraint. It could be related to an ex-post moral hazard problem, to limited
commitment or to the inalienability of human capital investments.1
Regardless of the source of the constraint, it is clear that if ￿ is su¢ ciently large, then entrepre-
neurs are able to jointly allocate a fraction ￿ of capital to the constrained sector 1. In such a case,
constraint (3) does not bind and the equilibrium is as described above. Hereafter we focus on the
more interesting case in which ￿ is low enough so that (3) binds. This requires:
Assumption 1: ￿￿ < ￿.
2.3 Closed Economy Equilibrium
We next turn to explore the autarky equilibrium of this economy. As noted above, under Assump-
tion 1 the ￿nancial constraint (3) binds, each entrepreneur invests an amount ￿K (of which (￿￿1)K
is borrowed), and the aggregate amount of capital allocated to sector 1 is:2
K1 = ￿￿K < ￿K. (4)
1A simplifying assumption in our setup is that the credit multiplier ￿ is independent of ￿. Aghion, Banerjee and
Piketty (1999) provide a microfoundation for this rental-rate insensitivity in a model with ex-post moral hazard and
costly state veri￿cation. See Tirole (2006) for a theoretical overview of di⁄erent models of ￿nancial contracting.
2This imposes that entrepreneurs invest all their endowment of K in sector 1. But this is necessarily a feature of
the equilibrium since, as we will see shortly, they can always obtain a higher return in that sector.
6Because labor can freely move across sectors, it is allocated to equate the value of its marginal












where, remember, p denotes the price of good 2 in terms of good 1 (the numeraire).
>From the consumer￿ s ￿rst order condition and goods market clearing we have
(1 ￿ ￿)Z (￿￿K)
￿ (L1)
1￿￿ = p￿Z ((1 ￿ ￿￿)K)
￿ (L ￿ L1)
1￿￿ , (6)
which together with the labor market condition in (5) implies that





￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿￿
< 1, (8)
where the inequality follows again from Assumption 1.
As indicated by equations (4) and (7), in our benchmark model ￿nancial frictions do not distort
the allocation of labor across sectors but shift capital to the unconstrained sector (sector 2). As a
result, sector 2￿ s output is ￿oversupplied￿and its relative price p is depressed.
Financial frictions also have signi￿cant e⁄ects on equilibrium factor prices. The rewards to labor
and uninformed capital (in terms of the numeraire) are pinned down by their marginal products in
the unconstrained sector, which using (8) yields:




















Note that both w and ￿ are increasing functions of the degree of ￿nancial contractibility ￿.
Other things equal, less ￿nancially developed economies feature depressed wages and depressed
returns to uninformed capital.
The e⁄ect of a fall in ￿ on the rental rate of uninformed capital is clear: the tighter borrowing
constraint reduces the demand for this type of capital in the constrained sector, thus increasing the
capital-labor ratio in the unconstrained sector and reducing its marginal product in terms of sector
2 output.3 Because the relative price p is an increasing function of ￿, the rental ￿ drops with the
fall in ￿ not only in terms of sector 2￿ s output but also in terms of sector 1￿ s output.
In order to facilitate a comparison with the open economy results, it is useful to decompose the
3Note that ￿=p = ￿Z ((1 ￿ ￿￿)K=((1 ￿ ￿)L))
￿￿1 is increasing in ￿.
7increase in the capital-labor ratio in sector 2 in three parts. The ￿rst e⁄ect, which we label the
￿capital allocation e⁄ect,￿ relates to the fact that a decrease in ￿ directly reduces the amount of
capital that the constrained sector can attract and thus increases the amount of capital employed
in the unconstrained sector. Because capital and labor are complements in production, this shift
in the allocation of capital induces a similar shift of labor from the constrained sector to the
unconstrained sector: a ￿capital-labor complementarity e⁄ect.￿In our log-linear model, this second
e⁄ect is exactly cancelled by a ￿goods-market clearing e⁄ect￿ : a decrease in ￿ leads to an increase
in supply of sector 2￿ s good, depresses its relative price p and induces labor to remain in sector 1
(see eq. (7)). Overall, we thus have that the capital-labor ratio increases in sector 2 because capital
rises while labor stays constant.
The changes in sectoral capital-labor ratios are also crucial for understanding the e⁄ects of a
fall in ￿ on the remuneration of workers. Wages fall in terms of sector 1 output (the numeraire)
because the capital-labor ratio in that sector is lower when ￿ is lower. By the same token, and
since the capital-labor ratio rises in sector 2, we have that w=p rises with the decline in ￿. All in
all, however, one can show that the real purchasing power of wages, that is w=p1￿￿, falls with a
decline in ￿.4
This discussion also suggests that uninformed capital su⁄ers disproportionately more from a









is decreasing in ￿. In sum, labor is hurt by the ￿nancial constraint but less so than capital because
the capital-labor ratio rises in sector 2, o⁄setting the downward pressure on wages due the decline
in p.
So far we have been silent on the return obtained by entrepreneurs (or informed capital). In the
frictionless economy, informed and uninformed capital are perfect substitutes and both obtain a
common rental rate ￿. However, when the borrowing constraint (3) binds, informed capital becomes
relatively scarce in sector 1 and entrepreneurs obtain a premium over the return of uninformed
investors in that sector. In particular, their return per unit of capital is
R = ￿ + ￿￿; (11)
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the ￿nancial constraint (3).5 In equilibrium,
















which is strictly positive (under Assumption 1) and also decreasing in ￿. Hence, the shadow value
4This follows from the fact that w=p
1￿￿ _ (￿￿)
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿(1￿￿), which is increasing in ￿ under Assumption 1.
5The return R follows from R = ￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿. Notice that the fact that R > ￿ justi￿es our assumption
above that entrepreneurs invest all their endowment of capital in sector 1.
8of entrepreneurial capital is higher in economies with less developed ￿nancial markets. Note from
(11), however, that this does not imply that the welfare of entrepreneurs is necessarily decreasing
in ￿.
Finally, because all agents in the economy share identical preferences, aggregate welfare is given
by total income in terms of consumption units. That is
U =
wL + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K + R￿K
p1￿￿ .
Using the expressions above, it is straightforward to check that U is proportional to w=p1￿￿, which
as argued above is strictly increasing in ￿. In sum, economies with more developed ￿nancial systems
attain higher welfare levels. We summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 1 In the closed economy equilibrium, an increase in ￿nancial contractibility ￿ has the
following e⁄ects: it raises the relative price of the unconstrained sector, the real return to uninformed
capital, real wages, and welfare; it lowers the wage-rental ratio, and it has an ambiguous e⁄ect on
entrepreneurial income.
2.4 Open Economy Equilibrium
Consider now a situation in which the economy we are studying, which we refer to as South, is open
to international trade with the rest of the world (or North). For expositional simplicity, we focus
for now on the case in which South is small, in the sense that it faces a ￿xed world relative price p.
As we will show below, our substantive implications do not depend on this assumption. We think
of the rest of the world as having the same preferences in (1) and the same production technologies
in (2) as South and also facing a ￿nancial friction, though smaller, in sector 1. For these reasons,
it is natural to focus on a situation in which p < 1. Below, however, we brie￿ y discuss the case in
which p ￿ 1.
As argued at the end of section 2.1, whenever p < 1, a frictionless small South would like to fully
specialize in the production of good 1. However the borrowing constraint in that sector prevents
this by limiting the aggregate allocation of capital to that sector to be no larger than ￿￿K. Thus,
the distribution of capital across sectors is identical to that in the closed economy.
Conversely, the allocation of labor across sectors is a⁄ected by the access to international trade
in goods. Condition (5) equating the value of the marginal product of labor across sectors still needs
to hold in equilibrium, but the allocation of labor no longer needs to be consistent with goods market
clearing as dictated by equation (6) above. This is the distinguishing e⁄ect of international trade
in the model: it detaches the allocation of factors across sectors from local demand conditions.
Instead, South faces an exogenously given relative price p, and thus (5) yields
L1 =
￿￿L
(1 ￿ ￿￿)p1=￿ + ￿￿
. (13)
The amount of labor allocated to the ￿nancially constrained sector 1 is decreasing in p and
9increasing in ￿. Intuitively, a larger p raises the value of the marginal product of labor in sector 2,
thus pulling labor away from sector 1. Similarly, a lower ￿ increases the amount of capital allocated
to the unconstrained sector 2, thus again raising the marginal product of labor in that sector.When
the world relative price p happens to coincide with South￿ s autarky price (in equation (8)), then
L1 coincides as well with the autarky allocation, i.e., L1 = ￿L. But when international trade
allows South to face a less depressed relative price p, South tilts the allocation of labor towards the
unconstrained sector 2, thus specializing in the less ￿￿nancially dependent￿sector.6
The equilibrium rewards to labor and uninformed capital are again pinned down by their mar-
ginal products in the unconstrained sector, which using (4) and (13) can be expressed as:
w = (1 ￿ ￿)Z
￿￿













It is straightforward to verify that both w and ￿ are increasing functions of the relative price
p. A larger p raises the incentive to shift resources to the unconstrained sector. This shift relaxes
the ￿nancial constraint in sector 1, and consequently reduces the premium remuneration obtained
by entrepreneurs, and increases the remuneration of labor and capital in terms of sector 1￿ s output.












which is strictly decreasing in p.7
In sum, by allowing South to specialize in the sector with lower ￿nancial frictions, international
trade reduces the negative impact of ￿nancial underdevelopment on the rewards of labor and
capital.8
6Although, we have made the assumption that South is relatively ￿nancially underdeveloped, the expressions in
this section apply also to the case in which the ￿nancial friction is lower in South. In the latter case, however, trade
integration leads to a decrease in p in South.
7In fact, the total return to entrepreneurial capital is necessarily decreasing in p as well. To see this, use equations
(15) and (16) to obtain:
R = ￿ + ￿￿ =
￿











which is strictly decreasing in p.
8Although, the decrease of the capital-labor ratio in sector 2 leads to a fall in the marginal product of labor in
terms of that sectors￿output (i.e., a fall of w=p), it is straightforward to show that the real wage w=p
1￿￿ is strictly
increasing in p. On the other hand, both ￿ and ￿=p are increasing in p, so a rise in p raises the real return to
uninformed capital.













is strictly decreasing in the relative price p. This implies that an increase in p bene￿ts uninformed
capital more than workers. The logic is straightforward: as p rises, sector 1 releases labor but not
capital to sector 2, so w=￿ has to fall for sector 2 to absorb these new workers.
Given equations (14), (15), (16) and (17), we can also study the e⁄ects of an improvement in
￿nancial contractibility, that is an increase in ￿, on equilibrium factor prices. Remember that in
the autarky equilibrium we established that w and ￿ were increasing in ￿, while w=￿ and ￿ were
decreasing in ￿. In the open economy equilibrium, it continues to be the case that w increases in ￿
and ￿ decreases with it.
In contrast to the closed economy, the return to uninformed capital is now decreasing in the
level of ￿nancial contractibility. This surprising result comes as the outcome of two opposing e⁄ects
that we discussed in the closed-economy section. The ￿rst e⁄ect is the direct ￿capital allocation
e⁄ect￿: a decrease in ￿ shifts capital from the constrained to the unconstrained sector. Holding
constant the allocation of labor across sectors, this diminishes the marginal product of capital. But
because of the second e⁄ect, the ￿capital-labor complementarity e⁄ect,￿ the allocation of labor is
no longer independent of ￿: in particular, a lower ￿ shifts labor from the constrained sector to the
unconstrained sector. In the closed-economy equilibrium, this second e⁄ect was exactly o⁄set by
the ￿goods-market clearing e⁄ect,￿ but this is precisely the e⁄ect that is absent in a small-open
economy equilibrium. Hence, we are left with the ￿rst two e⁄ects and it is straightforward to
show that the capital-labor complementarity e⁄ect dominates the capital allocation e⁄ect as long
as the constrained sector operates at a lower capital-labor ratio than the unconstrained one. With
symmetric technologies and ￿nancial constraints binding in the North, this is always true (see below
for more on this) and the marginal product of capital is decreasing in ￿.
We have thus shown that a small-open economy with a lower ￿ features lower wages but higher
rates of return to capital. It then follows that the wage-rental ratio is lower in small-open economies
with underdeveloped ￿nancial markets, a result which again stands in sharp contrast to that ob-
tained in the closed economy case.
2.5 Trade Integration with a More Financially Developed North
In this section we study more systematically an equilibrium in which South can freely trade with a
large North (or rest of the world). In order to isolate the role of ￿nancial development in shaping
trade ￿ ows, we assume that North is identical to South in every respect except for the level of
￿nancial development (and scale). We shall assume that
￿N > ￿S;
11so that North is more ￿nancially developed. We now can use the analysis in section 2.3 to conclude
that this large, ￿nancially developed North, pins down the following world relative price
pN =
 






Note that because pN < 1, both North and South produce both goods in equilibrium. The more
developed ￿nancial system in North implies, however, that South has a comparative disadvantage
in the constrained sector 1. Using equations (2), (14), (15), (16) and (18), we can express imports
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where the sign follows from ￿N > ￿S.
Despite the fact that there is diversi￿cation in production, factor price equalization does not
attain, since factor prices were shown above to depend on the particular level of ￿nancial develop-
ment in the corresponding region. Furthermore, from the derivations above, we have the following
result:
Proposition 2 In the free trade equilibrium, South produces both goods and is a net importer of the





The results on the ranking of factor prices follow from the comparative statics with respect to
￿ derived in the previous section. North and South share a common relative price pN, but South
features a lower ￿. Hence, relative to North, it must allocate a disproportionate amount of labor
to sector 2, it must have a relatively lower wage rate, and it must feature a relatively larger return
to informed and uninformed capital.
Using the results in section 2.4, we can also study the e⁄ects of trade integration from the point
of view of the South. This amounts to comparing the autarky and free trade equilibria in South,
which is in turn analogous to describing the e⁄ects of an increase in the relative price p in the small
open economy equilibrium since ￿N > ￿S implies pN > pS, where pS is the autarky relative price in
South. As demonstrated in the previous section, this increase in p shifts labor to the unconstrained
sector 2 and raises the real return of uninformed capital in terms of both goods. This positive e⁄ect
of trade integration on the real return to capital is at the core of the complementarity between trade
12and capital mobility discussed below and hence it is worth restating it in the form of a Proposition:
Proposition 3 Trade integration raises the real return to uninformed capital in the ￿nancially
underdeveloped South.
As discussed above, trade integration (i.e., an increase in p) also raises real wages in South but
reduces the wage-rental ratio as well as the return to entrepreneurial capital. Overall, however, one
can show that aggregate welfare in South is necessarily higher in the free trade equilibrium (see
section 2.6.E. for a general proof).
2.6 Robustness and Generalizations
Even though we explore a generalized version of our model later in section 5, here we brie￿ y
comment on the robustness and generality of the results stated in Propositions 2 and 3. This
discussion helps understanding the mechanisms behind our results.
A. No Financial Constraints in North
We focused above on the case in which North sets a world relative price p lower than 1. This is
the natural case to consider in a world in which countries are fully symmetric except for ￿nancial
development and the inequality ￿￿N < ￿ (analogous to Assumption 1) holds. Suppose instead that
￿nancial contracting in North is not a constraint so that ￿￿N ￿ ￿. Then, North features a value
of ￿ equal to 0 and sets a world relative price of p = 1. In the free trade equilibrium, South again
specializes in the unconstrained sector, but trade brings about factor price equalization. In this
case, free trade again raises the equilibrium values of the real return of uninformed capital in South,
but ￿S does not ￿overshoot￿the Northern rental ￿N.
The case in which the North sets a relative price higher than 1 can be studied analogously. The
South completely specializes in sector 2, which necessarily implies ￿ = 0. Factor prices are pinned
down by their marginal values in sector 2. In that case, however, factor prices depend on Southern
variables, so factor price equalization generally fails. The direction of failure depends on the exact
source of the relative price p > 1 in North.
In terms of the results above, we thus have that Proposition 3 continues to hold, which implies
that even when p ￿ 1 we have that trade and net capital in￿ ows are complements in South.
Henceforth, we focus on the case where the ￿nancial constraint is binding in North (i.e., p < 1).
B. General Symmetric Technologies
As shown in Appendix A.2., Propositions 2 and 3 continue to hold if we relax the Cobb-Douglas
assumptions and assume general homothetic preferences and general symmetric production func-
tions with constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal products. The key three equilibrium
properties that ensure the generality of the results are as follows: (a) the autarky relative price p
is always increasing in ￿; (b) the real return to uninformed capital is always increasing in p; (c)
13capital intensity is necessarily lower in the constrained sector 1 than in the unconstrained sector
2. The generality of (a) implies that trade integration is associated with an increase in p in South,
which together with (b) implies that Proposition 3 holds for general symmetric production tech-
nologies. Condition (c) in turn ensures that with free trade the rental rate is higher in South than
in North (Proposition 2). Furthermore, property (a) also implies that South is a net importer of
the ￿nancially dependent sector 1.9
We can thus conclude that whenever countries di⁄er only in ￿nancial development and sectors
di⁄er only in ￿nancial dependence, South specializes in the least ￿nancially dependent sector, trade
integration raises the real return to capital in South and, with free trade, this rental rate is larger
in South than in the more ￿nancially developed North.10
C. A Large South
We have so far treated North as a large enough country to ￿x world prices at pN in equation
(18). Suppose instead that both North and South are large enough to impact world prices. The
equilibrium is identical to that of two ￿small￿ open economies facing a common relative price
p, with the additional restriction that p should now ensure goods-market clearing at the world
level. If countries di⁄er only in ￿nancial development, then for general homothetic preferences
and symmetric production technologies, the equilibrium relative price p has to fall between the
Southern and Northern autarkic relative prices: pS < p < pN. Hence, it is still the case that trade
integration increases the real return to uninformed capital in South (Proposition 3). Furthermore,
all the statements in Proposition 2 continue to hold. The reason is that both countries share
a common p in equilibrium, and thus cross-sectional comparisons still follow from studying the
comparative statics with respect to ￿ holding p constant.
D. Adding Heckscher-Ohlin Features: A Preview
What happens when we introduce cross-sectional asymmetries in factor intensity as well as cross-
country asymmetries in relative factor endowments? Perhaps surprisingly, we show in section 5
(see also Appendix A.2) that an increase in p is always associated with an increase in the real
return to uninformed capital. Hence, in situations in which trade integration is associated with
an increase in the relative price p in South (as would be the case when countries di⁄er only in
their level of ￿nancial development and ￿N > ￿S), Proposition 3 continues to hold for general
asymmetric production technologies. This leads us to conclude that the complementarity between
trade integration and net capital in￿ ows in South is quite general (see section 5 for details).
9This follows from the fact that, with homothetic preferences, the consumption ratio C1=C2 in South is larger in
free trade than in autarky. On the other hand, the increase in p shifts labor to sector 2, and thus the production ratio
Y1=Y2 in South is lower in free trade than in autarky. Because consumption and production are equal in autarky and
trade balance must hold in the trade equilibrium, with free trade we must have C1 > Y1 and C2 < Y2.
10Conversely, the bene￿cial e⁄ect of trade liberalization on real wages that we obtained in the log-linear model
is not general. Although Southern wages in terms of sector 1 output always increase with p, once we relax our
Cobb-Douglas assumption, the purchasing power of these wages may or may not increase in p depending on demand
patterns.
14Consider next the generality of the ranking of factor prices derived in Proposition 2. Note that





for j = N;S, (19)
where c2 (￿) is a general neoclassical unit cost function and is thus increasing in both arguments.
Hence, unlike in the autarkic equilibrium case, with free trade it must be the case that either
wS > wN or ￿S > ￿N. On the other hand, for a general constant returns to scale technology in











for j = N;S: (20)




2. Equations (19) and (20) combined imply that the
ranking of factor prices is necessarily as derived in Proposition 2 provided that North operates





2, which is an empirically likely scenario.11 In section 5 below, we show that for
general asymmetric production functions, this condition holds provided that North is su¢ ciently
capital abundant relative to South.
E. Relationship with the Speci￿c-Factors Model
It may be apparent to the savvy reader that in the region of the parameter space in which ￿nancial
constraints bind, our model behaves similarly to a two-sector, three-factor speci￿c-factors model. In
fact, we next discuss a perfectly competitive three-factor model that features the same equilibrium
as our model. This will prove useful in understanding the mechanics of the model and also in
proving some general welfare results. We also argue, however, that there are important di⁄erences
between our framework and a standard speci￿c-factors model.
Consider a model analogous to the one we developed above, but now let uninformed capital and
entrepreneurial (informed) capital be distinct factors which are imperfect substitutes in production.
Production in sector 2 combines uninformed capital and labor according to a standard neoclassical





. Production in sector 1 combines uninformed capital,













where F1 is again a standard neoclassical production function. Assuming that all markets are
perfectly competitive, this model yields equilibrium allocations and factor prices identical to those
in our model whenever the endowments of informed and uninformed capital are equal to ￿K








2 is ensured by the fact that North specializes in the
constrained sector 1, which operates at an ine¢ ciently low capital-labor ratio.
15and (1 ￿ ￿)K, respectively. Because the allocation of the two types of capital to each sector is
independent of factor prices, the model behaves similarly to a standard speci￿c-factors model in
which ￿ governs the e⁄ective relative supply of the two types of factors to each sector.
Note, however, that there are important di⁄erences between our model and the speci￿c-factors
model. First, the speci￿cation in (21) is not imposed in an ad hoc manner, but it follows from
credit constraints. Second, the ￿nancial constraint mechanism also sheds light on why uninformed
capital may move more easily across borders than informed capital (it does not require individuals
to move with it). Third, as is apparent in (21), the parameter ￿ not only a⁄ects the allocation
of capital across sectors, but also operates as a sector-biased technological parameter in sector 2.
As a result of these features, our model provides sharp predictions for the pattern of comparative
advantage as well as for the incentives for capital to ￿ ow across borders with and without trade
integration. Conversely, in the speci￿c-factors model one could obtain just about any pattern of
comparative advantage and factor mobility by appropriate choices of the endowments of each type
of capital as well as their assumed ease of mobility across borders.
However, the most useful aspect of the analogy with a speci￿c-factors model is in terms of
welfare analysis. We argued above that in our benchmark model with Cobb-Douglas preferences and
technologies, welfare in South rises when moving from autarky to free trade. The mapping between
our model and a perfectly competitive three-factors model has the implication that this welfare
gain result continues to hold for general (well-behaved) preferences and technologies. Furthermore,
when both North and South are large, North also gains from trade liberalization with South.
3 Trade and Capital Mobility as Complements
As usual in international trade theory, so far we have studied scenarios in which goods can freely
move across countries, but factors of production cannot. In this section we consider the implications
of allowing for physical capital mobility. Following the lead of Mundell (1957), we study the
interaction of capital mobility and trade integration by comparing the incentives for capital mobility
with and without trade frictions. For simplicity, we develop our results within the log-linear model
developed above, but the discussion in section 2.6 should make it clear that our main results are
more general.
3.1 Capital Mobility with Prohibitive Trade Frictions
Consider ￿rst the case with trade frictions. In particular, consider a situation in which trade in
the numeraire sector 1 is costless, but trade costs in sector 2 are prohibitive. Without capital
mobility, the equilibrium is then as described in section 2.3 above. With free trade in just one
good, South cannot specialize in its comparative advantage sector and the equilibrium is identical
to the autarkic one. From equation (10), it is then clear that in such a case we have ￿N > ￿S. In
words, despite both countries sharing the same aggregate capital-labor ratio, the marginal product
of capital is higher in North than in South.
16If we then allow for physical capital mobility, uninformed capitalists in South have an incentive
to move their endowment of capital to North. The counterpart of this instantaneous ￿ ow of capital
is the future sequence of positive net imports of good 1 in South equal to the interest payments
of the capital stock exported from South to North.12 To see this formally, note that the amount
of non-entrepreneurial capital FS!N that needs to ￿ ow to North in order to ensure that ￿S in
















This expression is increasing in ￿N and decreasing in ￿S. Hence, the larger the di⁄erence in
￿nancial contractibility, the larger that share should be.13 As a counterpart of this capital ￿ ow,
South features perpetual net imports of good 1 in an amount MS
1 = ￿NFS!N.
This result bears some resemblance to those derived in the literature arguing that ￿nancial fric-
tions may help explain the Lucas (1990) paradox (Gertler and Rogo⁄, 1990, Shleifer and Wolfenzon,
2002, Reinhart and Rogo⁄, 2004, Kraay et al., 2005). To the extent that capital-scarce countries
also are ￿nancially underdeveloped, our closed-economy equilibrium can help rationalize why capital
does not ￿ ow to those countries.
Notice that we have restricted our analysis to allowing for mobility of uninformed capital.
Because the return to informed capital varies across countries, there might be an incentive for that
capital to move as well. If, however, we make the reasonable assumption that entrepreneurs have
to reside in the country where their projects are run, then our emphasis on uninformed capital
mobility is a natural one. Our stylized model simply captures the fact that machines are relatively
less costly to move internationally than human beings. In the conclusion we brie￿ y discuss the
main implications that follow from allowing for mobility of informed capital in our framework.
3.2 Capital Mobility with No Trade Frictions
We next consider the case in which there is free trade in both goods. Conceptually, this is analogous
to considering a situation in which there is substantial heterogeneity in ￿nancial dependence across
the set of goods that are traded in world markets. The equilibrium without physical capital mobility
we derived above then indicates that ￿S > ￿N: even though both countries feature the same
aggregate-capital labor ratio, the return to capital is higher in South. It then follows that if we
allow uninformed capitalists to move their endowment across borders, capital moves from North to
South. Furthermore, because the allocation of capital to the constrained sector in South is bounded
above by ￿￿SK, Northern capital ￿ owing to South is necessarily employed in sector 2.
12The assumption that interest payments are settled in sector 1 output is not important. In the case in which
sector 2 prices are equalized, we still obtain that the rental rate for uninformed capital is lower in South in autarky.
The reason for this is that in autarky both ￿ and ￿=p are increasing in ￿.
13If South is large enough, this (physical) capital ￿ ow has a non-negligible e⁄ect on the rental rate ￿
N in North. In
such a case, the required capital ￿ ow F continues to be increasing in ￿
N=￿
S but it is quantitatively smaller (relative
to South￿ s capital).
17Using equations (5), (10), (15), and (18), the exact capital ￿ ow required to ensure rental rate
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and again vanishes when ￿S ! ￿N. Importantly, because the capital ￿ ow makes both countries
share a common relative price p and a common rental rate ￿, wages w and the shadow price ￿
are also equalized across countries. Hence, as in the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model, free
good and factor mobility lead to factor price equalization. The main di⁄erence is that our model
requires both types of mobility for equalization to take place.
Our results show that, from the point of view of South, trade integration and capital in￿ ows
are complements. Only when trade is su¢ ciently free, does allowing for capital mobility lead to a
capital in￿ ow into South. It is interesting to note that this complementarity is reinforced by the
fact that the capital in￿ ow into South further increases trade ￿ ows between North and South. In
particular, we can show that capital mobility increases consumption but reduces production of good
1 in South. Consider production ￿rst. As argued before, the ￿nancial constraint in South implies
that Northern capital ￿ owing to South is employed in sector 2. As a result, this capital in￿ ow
increases the marginal product of labor in sector 2, which leads (by equation (5)) to a rellocation
of labor towards that sector. In sum, the Southern allocation of labor to sector 1 is lower than
without capital ￿ ows and hence production of sector 1￿ s output falls in South. On the other hand,
consumption in that sector is proportional to income, and capital mobility ensures that Southern
income converges up to the level of Northern income.14 Given these results, we can safely conclude
that capital mobility leads to an increase in trade ￿ ows between North and South.
This complementarity between trade ￿ ows and capital mobility in our model is in sharp contrast
with the substitutability present in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. As shown by Mundell
(1957), in that model trade frictions generate incentives for capital to ￿ ow into the capital-scarce
South, while a move toward free trade leads to factor price equalization and therefore eliminates
the incentive for capital to move across countries. Even when trade does not fully equalize factor
prices, trade integration induces a convergence of factor prices and reduces the incentive for capital
to move across countries. Hence, in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell world, trade and capital mobility
are substitutes.15
3.3 Capital Mobility with Intermediate Trade Frictions
The above results suggest that the real e⁄ects of allowing for capital mobility crucially depend
on the extent of trade integration. In this section we formalize this insight by considering cases
14The fact that the convergence is upwards follows from the fact that, in the small-open-economy equilibrium,
income in South is increasing in the relative price p, and North features a higher relative price p
N > p.
15Another distinction between our result and Mundell￿ s is that, without trade integration, in our model physical
capital mobility leads to a divergence in wage levels rather than a convergence, as wages in South are further depressed
by the capital out￿ ow. With free trade and physical capital mobility our model generates factor price equalization
and the capital in￿ ow pushes Southern wages up to the Northern level.
18with intermediate trade frictions. In order to do so, we again maintain the assumption that the
numeraire good 1 is freely tradable, but that good 2 is subject to an iceberg transport cost such
that a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of the good is lost in transit. Because in equilibrium South exports good
2, this is formally equivalent to North levying a tari⁄ on Southern imports. Alternatively, we could
have assumed that the trade friction is in sector 1. This would lead to identical expressions, but the
trade friction would then have analogous e⁄ects to an import tari⁄ levied by South (with the tari⁄
revenue being wasted). In either case, we can think of reductions in ￿ as reduction in transportation
costs or as trade liberalizations.
Given our assumption that South is a small open economy, the trade friction amounts to South-
ern producers facing relative prices equal to pN (1 ￿ ￿) rather than pN.16 As long as
pN (1 ￿ ￿) >
 







the trade friction is not prohibitive and it continues to be the case that South is a net exporter of
sector 2￿ s output. Values of ￿ between 0 and 1 ￿ pS
aut=pN represent levels of trade integration that
fall in between the free trade and autarky levels.
Because the trade friction ￿ has a monotonic e⁄ect on the relative price p faced by South, and
because the rental rate to uninformed capital is increasing in this relative price p, we obtain the
following result:





￿ < ￿ ￿ we have ￿N < ￿S, while for ￿ > ￿ ￿ we have ￿N > ￿S. Consequently, (physical) capital
migrates South when ￿ < ￿ ￿ and North if ￿ > ￿ ￿.
Proposition 4 summarizes the sense in which trade and capital mobility are complements in our
model. The particular value for the threshold integration level ￿ ￿ cannot be derived in closed form,
but applying the implicit function theorem to (15), we can conclude that @￿ ￿=@￿S < 0. In words,
the lower is ￿nancial development in South, the lower is the amount of trade integration needed to
ensure that capital ￿ ows into South when allowing for capital mobility.
Finally it is worth mentioning that with positive trade frictions, it is no longer the case that
trade integration and free physical capital mobility necessarily lead to factor price equalization.
Even when the direction of capital ￿ ows is from North to South, the presence of trade frictions
ensures that wages in South remain depressed.
4 Trade and Financial Capital Flows as Complements
Up to now we have studied the interaction of ￿nancial frictions and trade integration in shaping
the desired location of physical capital. We concluded that when trade frictions are signi￿cant,
16If the trade friction was in sector 1, then Southern consumers would have to pay a price 1=(1 ￿ ￿) when importing
the good (since Northern producers can obtain a price of 1 in North). The relative price of sector 2￿ s output would
again be p
N (1 ￿ ￿).
19there is an incentive for physical capital to migrate from the ￿nancially underdeveloped South to
the ￿nancially developed North, while the opposite is true when trade is frictionless. A related but
distinct issue is that of capital ownership. Who owns the capital located in each region? Answering
this question requires to model the implications of our earlier analysis for portfolio decisions and
capital ￿ ows, which is what we do in this section.17
By modeling the net capital ￿ ows implications of our view, we are able to connect with the
￿global imbalances￿ literature, which attempts to explain the large capital ￿ ows from South to
North observed in recent years. The main conclusion that emerges from the analysis below is
that protectionism, an increasingly likely political reaction in North, could exacerbate rather than
alleviate these ￿imbalances￿if ￿nancial factors are important determinants of trade patterns.18
4.1 A Dynamic Extension
Consider the following dynamic extension of our model, which essentially integrates the single-good
framework of Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) with the trade model in the previous sections.
Time evolves continuously. In￿nitesimal agents are born at a rate ￿ per unit time and die at
the same rate; population mass is constant and equal to L. All agents are endowed with one unit of
labor services which they supply inelastically to the market.19 Intertemporal preferences are such
that agents save all their income and consume only when they die (exit).20 Instantaneous utility
at the time of death is given by (1). Physical capital is tradable and is the only store of value. We
assume that the initial stock of capital is equal to K and we rule out any capital depreciation or
accumulation.
Entrepreneurs are born as such, and at any given instant they constitute a share ￿ of the
population. As in the static model, they naturally specialize in sector 1. Entrepreneurial rents
are not capitalizable (i.e., they cannot be used as store of value).21 Moreover, in the main text
we assume that these rents are taxed away and distributed back to the population at large as a
lump sum. The reason for this assumption is to avoid having to track the wealth dynamics of
two di⁄erent groups within each country and the feedback of these di⁄erential dynamics on factor
prices. We show in Appendix A.1, where we develop the full model without taxation, that none of
our main results in this section depends on this simpli￿cation.
At any point in time, factor prices are determined exactly as in the static model developed
17Since there is no concept of risk and hence of diversi￿cation in our model, we focus only on net but not gross
capital ￿ ows.
18See, e.g., The Economist (2006) for a discussion of some of the factors behind the protectionist view,
and multiple Greenspan speeches on the connection between global imbalances and trade imbalances. E.g.,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/trade/2003-11-20-gspan-protectionism_x.htm
19To simplify matters we do not distinguish between workers and capitalists in this section. Our previous results
on w, ￿, and ￿ can be interpreted as applying to the di⁄erent components of an agent￿ s income.
20Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) show that the crucial features of the equilibrium described below survive
to more general overlapping generation structures, such as that in Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1987).
21This is consistent with these rents stemming from the human capital of entrepreneurs. Note also that this
assumption is not inconsistent with entrepreneurs using their capital as collateral to borrow from uninformed investors
in the ￿interim￿periods.
20above. Nevertheless, in this dynamic model physical capital plays a dual role as a productive factor
and also as a store of value. To the extent that claims on this store of value are allowed to be
traded across borders, this dynamic model generates an alternative source of capital ￿ ows across
countries. Importantly, the key price that determines the direction of these capital ￿ ows is not the
rental rate ￿, but rather the interest rate r in each country before opening the capital account.
This interest rate di⁄ers from the static marginal product of capital, ￿, because the value of a unit
of capital need not be one in equilibrium (since capital is ￿xed) and there could be expected capital
gains or losses. We turn next to the determination of interest rates.
Let V
j
t denote the value of the stock of capital in country j = N;S at any instant t. The return
on holding K units of capital is equal to the dividend price ratio ￿jK=V
j

















t denote the savings accumulated by agents in country j up to date t. Savings decrease















With a closed capital account, it must be the case that savings equal to the value of the capital






















Factor prices are still determined by the static conditions in earlier sections, and hence they are
time invariant. It follows that _ W
j
t = _ V
j




Y j . (25)
If the ￿nancial friction is not binding, it follows directly from the symmetric Cobb-Douglas
assumption in (2) that rj = ￿￿. This is an upper bound for the interest rate in the economies we
consider.
Let us now reintroduce the binding ￿nancial friction. Consider ￿rst the case in which North






21The autarkic interest rate is thus an increasing function of ￿, which implies that South experiences
a capital out￿ow if it integrates to global capital markets when trade frictions are large. This is
the result highlighted by Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006).
The low interest rate in South re￿ ects the limited availability of assets to satisfy the local store
of value demand. The reason there are few assets is that the share of output received by uninformed
capital, the only capitalizable income, is depressed by the ￿nancial friction which pushes uninformed
capital toward the unconstrained sector and depresses its return.
We can contrast the autarky result with the polar opposite case where trade is frictionless.








which is now decreasing in ￿. That is, South experiences capital in￿ows if it integrates to global
capital markets.
The result that the interest rate is higher in South than in North is tightly related to our
previous ￿overshooting￿result regarding the rental rate of capital. Intuitively, by specializing in
the unconstrained sector, uninformed capital works with a disproportionate amount of labor in
economies with lower credit multipliers. As a result, a larger share of capital income is in the
form of capitalizable ￿uninformed capital income￿and the supply of store of value, relative to its
demand, is higher. Conversely, by specializing in the ￿nancially dependent sector, a ￿nancially
developed country raises the reward of entrepreneurs (who now employ more workers), thereby
reducing the share of capitalizable income in total income.
As in the case of physical capital mobility, the crucial di⁄erence between the autarky case and
the free trade case is that the ￿goods-market clearing e⁄ect￿is operative in the former case, but
not in the latter. We next turn to studying intermediate levels of openness, which corresponds to
situations with varying incidence of the goods-market clearing e⁄ect.
4.2 An Application: Protectionism Back￿res
The current ￿global imbalances￿have rekindled protectionist proposals. The direct logic behind
these proposals is that by raising trade barriers in North, the magnitude of trade surpluses in
South must decline. We argue in this section that if the current scenario is an equilibrium response
to heterogenous degrees of ￿nancial development across the world, protectionism may exacerbate
rather than reduce the imbalances.
We illustrate the reason behind our warning by showing that the pre-integration North-South
interest rate spread, which is the main factor behind the direction of capital ￿ ows in our model,
rises with trade frictions.
Let us extend the interest rate expression in (26) to cases of intermediate levels of trade frictions.
As in section 3.3, we consider situations in which sector 1￿ s output can be freely tradable, while a
fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of sector 2￿ s output melts in transit when shipped across countries. As a result,
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1=￿.
It is clear from inspection that, for a given pN, the di⁄erence rN ￿ rS is strictly increasing in ￿.
Furthermore, we have that:





￿ < ~ ￿ we have rN < rS, while for ￿ > ~ ￿ we have rN > rS. Consequently, ￿nancial capital migrates
South when ￿ < ~ ￿ and North if ￿ > ~ ￿.
This result is analogous to Proposition 4, but it now applies to ￿nancial capital instead of
physical capital.22
Suppose that the initial level of trade frictions is ￿0 ￿ ~ ￿ so that rN ￿ rS. Then ￿nancial
integration leads to capital out￿ ows from South to North, a situation that captures the current
scenario between emerging Asia and the U.S. We now want to compare the impact of ￿nancial
integration for di⁄erent values of trade friction ￿ ￿ ~ ￿. It is clear from the above discussion that
the larger is ￿, the larger is the gap rN ￿rS. We next show that a larger ￿ may also be associated
with larger current account surpluses in South.
Notice that ￿nancial integration does not a⁄ect factor prices and thus the value of production
in South. Hence, impact changes on the current account follow one-to-one from impact changes in
consumption. In our dynamic model, consumption in any instant is simply given by ￿W
j
t , since a
fraction ￿ of agents die and consume their wealth. How does ￿nancial integration a⁄ect wealth in
South? Note that before opening the capital account we have
WS




Right after opening up the capital account, the interest rate jumps from rS to rN and we have
WS





In sum, ￿nancial integration leads to a fall in wealth in the South, to reduced consumption, and
22We can also show that ~ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. In words, the required level of trade openess to attract ￿nancial capital ￿ ows
is lower than that required to attract physical capital ￿ ows. Hence, a liberalizing country should ￿rst experience
￿nancial capital in￿ ows and only later physical capital in￿ ows. Formally, this follows from the fact that interest rates
are proportional to ￿
jK=Y
j. Hence, at ￿ = ~ ￿, we have that r
S = r
N but still ￿
S < ￿
N, since income is lower in
South.











An alternative way to interpret the result is that the ratio qS = V S=KS, which measures the price
of a unit of capital in South, falls on impact when South ￿nancially integrates with North. This
decline in the value of domestic capital yields a negative wealth e⁄ect that reduces consumption in
South and generates a current account surplus.
We can now compare the impact e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration for di⁄erent values of ￿. Notice



















It is then apparent that for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ (i.e., rN ￿ rS), the capital loss in South worsens with a rise
in protectionism. This in turn exacerbates the trade surplus recorded in South following ￿nancial
integration.23 That is, protectionism back￿res (if the goal is to reduce North￿ s trade de￿cits).
In our derivations we have treated South as small relative to North, but it should be apparent
that our substantive results do not depend on this assumption. The main signi￿cant di⁄erence is
that, in the two-large region model, ￿nancial integration also reduces the interest rate in North,
thus creating a positive wealth e⁄ect that induces North to increase consumption on impact and
increase their trade de￿cit vis ￿ vis South.
4.3 An Application and Extension: High Saving Rate in Regions of South
The implication that regions in South that are more open to trade are more prone to receive
net capital in￿ ows may appear as counterfactual when comparing Asia and Latin America. The
economies in the former region are at least as open as those in the latter, but they typically run
current account surpluses that are signi￿cantly larger than those of Latin American economies.
However, there is no contradiction once one also considers that Asian economies have much higher
saving rates.
Our dynamic model is ￿ exible enough to accommodate such situations. In particular, suppose
that South is split between high and low saving regions ￿ for example, Asia and Latin America,
respectively. Because consumption in any instant is equal to a fraction ￿ of wealth, a natural way
to capture this di⁄erent propensity to consume is to have
￿S;Asia < ￿N < ￿S;LA:
23Note that an increase in trade frictions may reduce the trade surplus in the South when the initial trade friction
is already very signi￿cant. The reason for this result is that, in such case, ￿
S is so depressed that W
S does not have
much space to fall as a result of ￿nancial integration.
24If all countries in South have identical ￿nancial markets, endowments, technology, and instanta-




￿S;LA rS;LA < rS;LA.
Now if ￿S;Asia is su¢ ciently lower than ￿N, then it may well be the case that even if Asia is




In words, although trade integration brings the marginal product of capital in Asia above that in
North, the larger propensity to save in Asia makes them net exporters of ￿nancial capital in a world
with ￿nancial integration. Similarly, even though limited trade integration might not increase the
marginal product of capital in Latin America by much (and we might have ￿S;LA < ￿N), the lower
propensity to save of Latin America makes them net importers of ￿nancial capital when the capital
account is open (i.e., rS;LA > rN). More generally, high savings countries in South need to be more
open to trade than low saving countries in order to experience net capital in￿ ows.24
5 A Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell Extension
Our benchmark model isolates the e⁄ects of cross-country and cross-sectoral heterogeneity in ￿nan-
cial frictions on the structure of trade and capital ￿ ows. In this section, we introduce Heckscher-
Ohlin determinants of international trade into the analysis. The purpose of this extension is twofold.
On the one hand, we seek to explore the robustness of our results to more general speci￿cations
of preferences and technology. On the other hand, we want to study how the standard results of
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model are modi￿ed by the presence of imperfect capital markets. For
this reason, we focus on the range of parameter values for which the ￿nancial constraint binds.
As in the previous sections, we begin by developing a highly parameterized version of the model.
In Appendix A.2, we develop a model with general functional forms, in the spirit of the classical
treatments of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model.
5.1 Environment
The model is a simple extension of our benchmark static model. We allow production technologies
to di⁄er in (primitive) factor intensity and endow countries with di⁄erent relative endowments (that
24Our model o⁄ers an alternative explanation for Latin America attracting larger net capital in￿ ows than Asia
despite being less open to trade. In particular, just as in the case of physical capital, the amount of trade integration
needed to ensure net ￿nancial capital in￿ ows into South is lower the lower is ￿nancial development in South. Hence,
the observed patterns are also consistent with Latin America being less ￿nancially developed than Asia.
25is, di⁄erent aggregate capital-labor ratios). For simplicity, we continue to assume Cobb-Douglas
preferences and technologies, but we now allow for a larger output elasticity of capital in sector 1:
Xi = Z (Ki)
￿i (Li)
1￿￿i , i = 1;2, with ￿1 > ￿2.
In words, we assume that there is a positive cross-industry correlation between (primitive) capital
intensity and frictions in ￿nancial contracting. This speci￿cation is consistent with available data.25
The frictionless, closed-economy equilibrium of this two-sector model is straightforward to char-





￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
K
of capital to sector 1. For ￿nancial frictions to bind, we hence now require:
Assumption 1￿ : ￿￿ <
￿1￿
￿￿1+(1￿￿)￿2.
5.2 Closed Economy Equilibrium













We combine this condition with goods market clearing
(1 ￿ ￿)Z (￿￿K)
￿1 (L1)
1￿￿1 = p￿Z ((1 ￿ ￿￿)K)
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As in our benchmark model, the allocation of labor across sectors is identical to that in the
case without ￿nancial frictions. Combined with the fact that the economy allocates an ine¢ ciently
large amount of capital to sector 2, we again obtain that good 2 is oversupplied and its relative
price is depressed.
25The most widely used cross-industry measure of ￿nancial dependence is given by the share of capital expenditures
not ￿nanced with cash ￿ ow from operations (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Manova (2007) reports a positive cross-
sectoral correlation of 0.14 between capital intensity and external ￿nance dependance. Importantly, this correlation
is computed using U.S. data, for which actual capital intensities are more likely to be tightly related to output
elasticities of capital. The fact that ￿1 > ￿2 is however perfectly consistent with ￿nancially dependent sectors
operating at relatively low capital intensities in ￿nancially underdeveloped countries.
26The result that the allocation of labor across sectors is invariant to the level of ￿nancial frictions
depends on our assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences and technology. Nevertheless, as shown in
Appendix A.2, the result that the relative price p is increasing in ￿ holds for arbitrary neoclassical
production functions and homothetic preferences.
An important di⁄erence between the present model and our benchmark one is that relative
factor endowment di⁄erences generates cross-country variation in the relative price p. In particular,
a labor abundant, ￿nancially underdeveloped South features a relatively lower p, not only because of
￿nancial frictions but also because sector 2 is labor intensive and autarky wages in labor abundant
countries are, ceteris paribus, lower.26
We next turn to describing the equilibrium factor prices of this closed economy equilibrium.
The rewards to labor and uninformed capital are pinned down by their marginal products in the
unconstrained sector, which using (27) and (28) yields






















As in our benchmark economy, both w and ￿ are increasing in ￿nancial development ￿, but the
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is decreasing in ￿. The intuition for these results is analogous to that in our benchmark economy.
Suppose now that the world consists of two economies, North and South, that di⁄er not only in
￿nancial development, but also in their relative factor endowments. North features a larger value
of ￿ and also a larger capital-labor ratio K=L. We consider ￿rst the case of limited trade in which
countries can only trade in the numeraire sector.
Given limited trade, in which direction does physical capital ￿ ow? Our benchmark model
suggests that the larger level of ￿ in North implies that ￿N > ￿S, and capital ￿ ows from South to
North. The Heckscher-Ohlin model instead predicts that, in autarky, the lower K=L in South leads
to ￿N < ￿S and capital ￿ ows from North to South.
Since this extended model incorporates both e⁄ects, it is not surprising that the direction of
26This corresponds to the ￿price version￿of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. As shown in Appendix A.2, however,
for general production functions in the two sectors, this positive mapping between p and K=L may fail to hold
whenever the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is much smaller in the unconstrained sector than
in the constrained sector. The condition we derive in the Appendix resembles that derived by Amano (1977) for the
case of the speci￿c-factors model.







^ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1) [ K=L,
where hats denote proportional di⁄erences. The ￿rst term re￿ ects the e⁄ect identi￿ed in our
benchmark model. The second term relates to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin e⁄ect, which is at the
core of Mundell￿ s prediction that trade frictions foster capital in￿ ows into the capital-scarce South.
We summarize our result as follows:
Proposition 6 Suppose ￿N > ￿S and KN=LN > KS=LS. Provided that di⁄erences in capital-
labor ratios are small relative to di⁄erences in ￿nancial contractibility, with limited trade, capital
￿ows from South to North.
5.3 Open Economy Equilibrium
Consider now the case in which South is small and thus faces exogenous relative prices p. We
again focus on the case in which North shares the same preferences and technologies as South
and ￿N satis￿es Assumption 1￿ . This ensures that South does not specialize completely in the
unconstrained sector and allocates an amount ￿￿K of capital to sector 1.27
As in our benchmark model, the allocation of labor across sectors is now uniquely pinned down












Although equation (31) does not provide a closed form solution for L1, it is straightforward to see
that, just as in the benchmark economy, L1 is decreasing in p and increasing in ￿. When South
opens up to trade with a North that pins down a higher relative price p, South specializes in the
labor-intensive sector, where ￿nancial frictions are lower. Notice that North pins down a higher
relative price p not only because of the e⁄ect isolated in the benchmark model, but also because
its larger capital-labor ratio is associated with a larger price of the labor-intensive good.
Letting  1 ￿ L1=L, we can next write wages and the rental rate of uninformed capital as a
function of this endogenous variable

















N is large enough, then South specializes in sector 2 to the point at which ￿nancial constraints cease to bind.
In such a case, the model behaves as the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model and, if K
S=L
S is large enough, factor price
equalization attains. As we will see later, however, even in this case trade integration raises the Southern rental rate
￿
S relative to the Northern one. This is in sharp contrast to the result obtained in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin
model.
28Because  1 is decreasing in p, it follows that both w and ￿ are increasing functions of p, regardless
of di⁄erences in factor intensity and factor abundance. This implies that as in the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, trade integration raises wages (in terms of the numeraire) in the capital-scarce South.
Nevertheless, contrary to the standard model, the real return to uninformed capital also goes up
as a result of trade integration. Even more surprisingly, using (31), (32) and (33), the ratio w=￿
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which is decreasing in p, since  1 is decreasing in p. In words, although trade integration raises
wages, it raises the rental rate of capital even more. A necessary implication of this result is that,
with trade opening, Southern wages increase in terms of the numeraire, but decrease relative to
sector 2￿ s prices. Using Jones￿(1965) hat algebra, we have ^ ￿ > ^ p > ^ w > 0, where hats denote
percentage changes. This contrasts with the ranking dictated by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem:
^ w > ^ p > 0 > ^ ￿. In summary, we have derived the following anti-Stolper-Samuelson proposition:
Proposition 7 (Anti-Stolper-Samuelson) Regardless of di⁄erences in factor intensity and rel-
ative factor abundance, trade integration with a more ￿nancially developed and capital abundant
North reduces the wage-rental ratio in South. As a result, the rental rate increases relative to the
price of both sectors, while wages increase relative to the price of the import sector, but fall relative
to the price of the export sector.
The intuition for this result is analogous to that in the benchmark model. Regardless of relative
factor intensities, as p rises, sector 1 releases labor but not capital to sector 2, so w=￿ has to adjust
downwards to decrease its capital intensity.
This result bears some resemblance to the result in a speci￿c factors model in which capital
is sector speci￿c but labor can move across sectors. As is well understood, in that type of model,
trade integration increases the real reward of the capital speci￿c to that sector, while having an
ambiguous e⁄ect on real wages.28 In our model, uninformed capital is not sector-speci￿c, but the
rents obtained by informed capital are sector-speci￿c and this explains the similar predictions that
emerge in both models.
5.4 Direction of Capital Flows
So far we have focused on studying the e⁄ects of trade integration in South, which correspond to
studying an increase in the relative price p. Next we explore the relative factor prices in North and
South, from which we learn the (desired) direction of capital ￿ ows in the free trade equilibrium.
This analysis amounts to characterizing the comparative statics with respect to ￿ and K=L, given
that both North and South share the same relative price p and are identical in all other dimensions.
28As a matter of fact, in our log-linear model, we can show that the real wage, that is w=p
1￿￿, is nececessarily
higher under free trade. But this result is functional-form speci￿c.












































where remember that  1 is the share of labor allocated to sector 1.
These equations illustrate that the country with the larger capital-labor ratio (North) features
a relatively higher wage and lower rental rate of capital. This is consistent with the predictions of
the Heckscher-Ohlin model outside the factor price equalization set.
Furthermore, provided that  1 > ￿￿j holds in both countries, the larger ￿ in North contributes
further to ensuring that the rental rate in South settles at a higher level than that in North:
￿S > ￿N. In our benchmark model, this was the only e⁄ect at play. There, we had that  1 = ￿ and
￿ > ￿￿ necessarily held in an economy where ￿nancial frictions bind. In our more general model,
the condition  1 > ￿￿ may fail to hold if ￿1 is su¢ ciently larger than ￿2.29
Still, even when  1 < ￿￿, our analysis suggests that large enough di⁄erences in K=L always
ensure that ￿S > ￿N. How large need di⁄erences in K=L be? Our exposition following Proposition
2 in section 2.5 suggested a simple (and in our view plausible) condition that ensures that ￿S > ￿N,
namely that North operates sector 2￿ s technology at a higher capital-labor ratio than South does.
5.5 Discussion
In our benchmark model, we derived the result that the di⁄erence ￿S ￿￿N is negative with limited
trade but positive with free trade. Our extended analysis with Heckscher-Ohlin features illustrates
that neither of these two statements holds for arbitrary capital-labor di⁄erences across countries
and sectors.
Nevertheless, our model does show that if ￿S ￿ ￿N is positive with limited trade, it is even
larger with free trade. In other words, the incentive for capital to ￿ ow towards the South is always
enhanced by trade integration. Similarly, if ￿S ￿￿N is negative under free trade, it is more negative
with limited trade, and hence the incentives for capital to out￿ ow from South are reduced by trade
integration. In sum, in this extended model it continues to be the case that trade and capital ￿ ows
are complements rather than substitutes.
The key conditions that ensure this result are that (i) South features a depressed relative price
p in the closed-economy equilibrium, and that (ii) in the free trade equilibrium, the rental rate of
uninformed capital in South is increasing in the relative price p. We showed above that these two
conditions are satis￿ed whenever preferences and technologies are Cobb-Douglas. In Appendix A.2,
we show that condition (ii) continues to be satis￿ed for general neoclassical production functions
29In particular,  1 > ￿￿ fails if ￿1 ￿ ￿2 is large enough to make sector 1 operate at a higher capital-labor ratio
than sector 2.
30and homothetic preferences. This is related to the ￿full￿generality of our anti-Stolper-Samuelson
result in Proposition 7. As for condition (i), we show in Appendix A.2. that it is also generally
satis￿ed, except for situations in which the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is
much smaller in the unconstrained sector than in the constrained sector and North-South di⁄erences
in capital abundance are large relative to di⁄erences in ￿nancial development.
Given these results, we conclude that our model delivers a robust complementarity between
trade ￿ ows and capital mobility.
6 Final Remarks
The main message of this paper is that when variation in ￿nancial development and ￿nancial
dependence are signi￿cant determinants of comparative advantage, trade and capital ￿ ows become
complements in ￿nancially underdeveloped countries. This complementarity is in sharp contrast
to the substitutability that arises in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell framework, and has
important practical implications. For example, it says that deepening trade liberalization in South
raises its ability to attract foreign capital. At the global level, it implies that protectionist policies
aimed at reducing the so called ￿global imbalances￿may back￿re and exacerbate them. And while
we do not analyze the normative aspects of liberalization processes, our framework hints that it is
important for developing economies to liberalize trade before the capital account, if capital out￿ ows
are to be averted.
Our complementarity result follows from the fact that trade liberalization allows an allocation
of labor to sectors that is independent of local demand conditions. As a result, a ￿nancially
underdeveloped country is able to allocate a disproportionate amount of workers in sectors in which
￿nancial frictions are less severe, thereby increasing the marginal product of capital. Although we
initially derived this result for the case in which South is a small open economy and preferences
and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, we later demonstrated that the result is general. In particular,
in a world in which countries di⁄er only in ￿nancial development and sectors di⁄er only in ￿nancial
dependence, trade integration necessarily reduces (and actually overturns) the gap between the
real return to capital in North and South. Furthermore, even after introducing Heckscher-Ohlin
determinants of trade, our complementarity result continues to hold under weak conditions.
In order to keep our analysis focused, we only allowed physical and ￿nancial capital to ￿ ow
across borders. Our framework can however easily accommodate mobility of informed capital.
Remember that in our benchmark model the shadow value of entrepreneurial capital ￿ is larger in
South than in North, that is ￿S > ￿N. If we allowed them to move, Northern entrepreneurs might
want to migrate to South to run projects there (and they would surely want to if they could borrow
a multiple ￿N ￿1 of their endowment when producing in South). We leave this issue for future work
but point at two immediate and related implications of allowing for this sort of mobility. First, in
contrast to the case of uninformed capital, ￿informed capital￿migrates to the import-competing,
￿nancially dependent sector in South rather than to its export sector. As a result, informed capital
31￿ ows are trade-reducing rather than trade-enhancing. Second, trade integration reduces the gap in
the value of ￿ across countries, and thus the incentive for informed capital to ￿ ow across countries
are reduced by trade integration. These two e⁄ects jointly suggest that informed capital mobility
and trade are substitutes rather than complements.
32References
Aghion, Philippe, Abhijit Banerjee, and Thomas Piketty (1999), ￿Dualism and Macroeconomic Volatility,￿
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 4, pp. 1359-1397.
Amano, Akihiro (1977), ￿Speci￿c Factors, Comparative Advantage and International Investment,￿ Eco-
nomica, Vol. 44, No. 174, pp. 131-144.
Aoki, Kosuke, Gianluca Benigno, and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (2006), ￿Adjusting to Capital Account Liberal-
ization,￿unpublished manuscript London School of Economics.
Bardhan, Pranab and Kenneth Kletzer (1987), ￿Credit Markets and Patterns of International Trade,￿
Journal of Development Economics, Volume 27, Issues 1-2, pp. 57-70.
Beck, Thorsten (2002), ￿Financial Development and International Trade : Is There a Link?,￿Journal of
International Economics, Vol. 57, Issue 1, pp. 107-131.
Blanchard, Olivier J. (1985), ￿Debt, De￿cits, and Finite Horizons,￿Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93,
No. 2, pp. 223-247.
Boyd, John H. and Bruce D. Smith (1997), "Capital Market Imperfections, International Credit Markets
and Nonconvergence," Journal of Economic Theory, 73:2 335-364.
Brecher, Richard A. and Ronald Findlay (1983), ￿Tari⁄s, Foreign Capital and National Welfare with Sector-
Speci￿c Factors,￿Journal of International Economics, Volume 14, Issues 3-4, pp. 277-288.
Caballero, Ricardo J., Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2006), ￿An Equilibrium Model of
￿ Global Imbalances￿and Low Interest Rates,￿manuscript Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Gertler, Mark and Kenneth S. Rogo⁄ (1990), ￿North-South Lending and Endogenous Domestic Capital
Market Ine¢ ciencies,￿Journal of Monetary Economics, 26:2, pp. 245-266.
Jones, Ronald W. (1965), ￿The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models,￿ Journal of Political
Economy, 73, pp. 557-572.
Jones, Ronald W. (1971), ￿A Three-Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History,￿ in Bhagwati, et al.,
eds., Trade, Balance of Payments, and Growth: Essays in Honor of C. P. Kindleberger, Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Jones, Ronald W. (1989), ￿Co-movements in Relative Commodity Prices and International Capital Flows:
A Simple Model,￿Economic Inquiry, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp. 131-41.
Ju, Jiandong and Shang-Jin Wei (2006), ￿Endowment Versus Finance: A Wooden Barrel Theory of Inter-
national Trade,￿CEPR Discussion Paper 5109.
King, Robert G. and Ross Levine (1993), ￿Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right,￿Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 717-737.
Kraay, Aart, Norman Loayza, Luis ServØn, and Jaume Ventura (2005), ￿Country Portfolios,￿Journal of
the European Economic Association, 3:4, pp. 914-945.
Lucas, Robert (1990), ￿Why Doesn￿ t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?￿ American Economic
Review, 80:3, pp.92-96.
Manova, Kalina (2007), ￿Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms and International Trade, ￿unpublished
manuscript, Harvard University.
33Markusen, James R. (1983), ￿Factor Movements and Commodity Trade as Complements,￿ Journal of
International Economics, Volume 14, Issues 3-4, pp. 341-356.
Matsuyama, Kiminori (2005), ￿Credit Market Imperfections and Patterns of International Trade and Cap-
ital Flows,￿Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 3, No. 2-3, pp. 714-723.
Mendoza, Enrique G., Vincenzo Quadrini, and JosØ-Victor Rios-Rull (2007), ￿Financial Integration, Finan-
cial Deepness and Global Imbalances,￿NBER Working Paper No. 12909.
Mundell, Robert A. (1957), ￿International Trade and Factor Mobility,￿American Economic Review, Vol.
47, No. 3, pp. 321-335.
Neary, J. Peter (1995), ￿Factor Mobility and International Trade,￿Canadian Journal of Economics , Vol.
28, Special Issue, pp. S4-S23.
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales (1995), ￿What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some
Evidence from International Data,￿Journal of Finance, 50:5, pp. 1421-1460.
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales (1998), ￿Financial Dependence and Growth,￿American Economic
Review 88:3, 559-586.
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogo⁄ (2004), ￿Serial Default and the ￿Paradox￿of Rich to Poor
Capital Flows,￿American Economic Review, 94:2, pp. 52-58.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1971), ￿Ohlin Was Right,￿Swedish Journal of Economics, Vol. 73, pp. 365-384.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny (1997), ￿A Survey of Corporate Governance,￿Journal of Finance,
Vol. 52, No. 2., pp. 737-783.
Shleifer, Andrei and Daniel Wolfenzon (2002), ￿Investor Protection and Equity Markets,￿Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics, 66:1, pp. 3-27.
The Economist (2006), ￿More Pain than Gain.￿September 14th.
Tirole, Jean (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Weil, Philippe (1989), ￿Overlapping Families of In￿nitely-Lived Agents,￿Journal of Public Economics, Vol.
38, Issue 2, pp. 183-198.
Wynne, JosØ (2005), ￿Wealth as a Determinant of Comparative Advantage,￿American Economic Review,
2005, Vol. 95, Issue 1, pp. 226-254.
34Appendix
A. 1 The Dynamic Model without Lump-Sum Taxation
In the dynamic version of our model developed in the main text, we assumed that entrepreneurial rents were
taxed away and distributed back in a lump-sum manner to the population at large. In this Appendix we
relax this assumption and characterize the di⁄erent wealth dynamics of agents born as entrepreneurs and
as non-entrepreneurs. The main complication derives from the fact that the share of capital in the hands
of entrepreneurs is no longer pinned down by the parameter ￿; but is also a function of other equilibrium
variables. As a result, this share di⁄ers in the closed-economy and free trade equilibria. In other words,
trade integration leads to an endogenous relaxation or tightening of the ￿nancial constraint. Despite these
complications, we show that our qualitative results on section 4 remain unaltered, and that Assumption 1
still su¢ ces for the ￿nancial constraint to be binding.
As in the main text, we let V
j
t denote the value of the tradable stock of capital in country j = N;S
at any instant t and q
j
t is the price of a unit of this capital. The return on holding one unit of uninformed







t + _ q
j
t: (34)
Importantly, note that this characterizes the value of a unit of uninformed capital held by everybody
(entrepreneurs and not). Capital is worth more to entrepreneurs since they obtain an excess return, but this
excess return is non-tradable. Still, the higher income that entrepreneurs receive from capital raises asset
demand and hence bids up the price of capital.
Let W
j;i
t denote the savings accumulated by agents of type i = e (entrepreneurs) and i = u (unin-
formed) in country j up to date t. Savings decrease with withdrawals (deaths), and increase with labor,



















































We next explore the steady state of this model. While entrepreneurs obtain a higher income period
by period, the ￿nite-horizon nature of our model implies that the distribution of wealth converges to a
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j=qj (39)




Y j . (40)
Notice that whenever ￿
j ! 0, the share of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs converges to ￿, just
as in the static model. With ￿
j > 0, the higher entrepreneurial income translates into a steady state
entrepreneurial share of wealth ~ ￿ that is larger than ￿. Importantly, this share ~ ￿ is a function of factor
prices (as indicated by equation (39)), and thus it will vary depending on whether the economy is open to
international trade or not. Similarly, in the static model factor prices were a⁄ected by the share of wealth
(capital) in the hands of entrepreneur. These interactions between equilibrium factor prices and the tightness
of the ￿nancial constraint complicate the analysis, but as illustrated below the analysis remains tractable.
Closed Economy Equilibrium





















where we have dropped country superscripts and time subscripts for simplicity. It is clear that whenever
￿ > 0, we have ~ ￿ > ￿. This may suggest that Assumption 1 is no longer su¢ cient to ensure that ￿nancial
constraints bind in the steady state. Note however that if we had ~ ￿￿ > ￿ > ￿￿, then the ￿rst inequality would
imply ￿ = 0 and ~ ￿ = ￿, thus contradicting the second inequality. Hence, we must have either ￿￿ < ~ ￿￿ < ￿
or ~ ￿￿ = ￿￿ > ￿. Assumption 1 then su¢ ces to ensure that the ￿rst of these cases applies.




(1 ￿ ~ ￿￿)￿
~ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ 1, (42)
where we have replaced ￿ with ~ ￿, since the fraction of the capital stock in the hands of entrepreneurs is now
given by ~ ￿, not ￿.
On the other hand, from equation (40), the ratio r=￿ is given by ￿
jK=Y j. Using equations (9), (10) and




1 ￿ ~ ￿￿
￿
: (43)
where again ~ ￿ is replacing ￿.






















which implicitly de￿nes ~ ￿ as a function of ￿ and other parameter values. This expression is cumbersome,
but in order to study the e⁄ects of ￿nancial development ￿ on the variables of interest (wages, rental rates,
interest rates...), it su¢ ces to study how ￿ ￿ ~ ￿￿ varies with ￿.













A = ￿￿. (45)
We next show that ￿ is increasing in ￿. Since the left-hand-side of (45) is decreasing in ￿, while the
right-hand-side is increasing in ￿, it su¢ ces to show that the left-hand-side of (45) is increasing in ￿. A few





















1 ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))￿ + ￿2 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 2￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)2￿
.
Hence we need only show that g (￿) > 0 for all ￿ in the relevant range. But note that
g0 (￿) = ￿2(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿) < 0,
since ￿ = ~ ￿￿ < ￿.30 Hence, we need only show that g (￿) > 0 when evaluated at the highest possible value
of ￿; which is ￿. But this follows from
g (￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)) > 0.
This proves that in the steady state of our model with endogenous tightness of the credit constraint, ~ ￿￿ is
still necessarily an increasing function of ￿. From inspection of the equilibrium values of the closed-economy
equilibrium, we can immediately conclude that wages, the rental rate of uninformed capital and the interest
rate are larger in a ￿nancial developed North than in a ￿nancial underdeveloped South. Hence, for large
enough trade frictions it continues to be the case that there is an incentive for capital (both physical as well
as ￿nancial) to ￿ ow out of South.
Free Trade Equilibrium
In the main text, we showed that these last conclusions are radically reversed whenever trade in goods is
su¢ ciently free. We next show that this reversal continues to be the case in this more complicated dynamic
model.
With free trade, the equilibrium steady state value of r and ~ ￿ are still given by equations (40) and (41),




= p￿1=￿ ￿ 1





~ ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ~ ￿￿)p1=￿
￿
,
where again ~ ￿ replaces ￿.





































As in the closed economy equilibrium, to show that ￿ is increasing in ￿, it su¢ ces to show that the left-
hand-side of the above equation is increasing in ￿. But note that this is clearly true, since ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)p1=￿
is increasing in ￿ for p < 1. Hence, we again have that ~ ￿￿ is an increasing function of ￿.
This result ensures that, in the free trade equilibrium, wages are increasing in ￿, while the rental rate
of uninformed capital and the interest rate are decreasing in ￿. Hence the direction of both types of capital
￿ ows are from North to South, just as in the model with ￿exogenous￿credit constraints.
A. 2 The Static Model with General Functional Forms
In this Appendix we extend the static model to general neoclassical production functions and general ho-
mothetic preferences. In particular, we assume that each country allows a representative consumer with
identical homothetic preferences, by which we can express demand in sector 1 relative to demand in sector
2 as a function ￿(p) of the relative price p. We also assume that both countries have access to the same
technologies to produce goods 1 and 2, and that these technologies feature constant returns to scale, contin-
uously diminishing marginal products and no factor intensity reversals. Letting k = K=L, we denote output
per worker under each of these technologies by f1 (k) and f2 (k).
Let us ￿rst consider the equilibrium of the closed economy. As in the main text, we assume that ￿ is
low enough to ensure that the credit constraint binds and the amount of capital allocated to sector 1 is








= ￿(p)(1 ￿  1)f2
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿






























































38The ￿rst condition ensures goods-market equilibrium. The next two conditions characterize optimality
in sector 1, while the last two ones characterize optimal behavior in sector 2. Although it is impossible to
solve for equilibrium prices and the allocation of labor to each sector as a function of parameters, we can
learn a great deal about the characteristics of the equilibrium by using Jones￿(1965) hat algebra approach.
Log-di⁄erentiating the above system (46) and after a few manipulations we obtain:
^  1 + ￿1
￿




(1 ￿  1)







(1 ￿  1)

































(1 ￿  1)
^  1 + ^ k
￿
b p = (1 ￿ ￿2) ^ w + ￿2^ ￿, (47)












" ￿ ￿0 (p)p=￿(p)
These correspond to sector i￿ s elasticity of output with respect to capital, sector i￿ s elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor, and the elasticity of substitution in consumption between goods 1 and 2.
The system (47) can be solved to obtain ^ p, ^ w, ^ ￿, ^ ￿, and ^  1 as a function of b ￿ and ^ k. These expressions shed
light on the cross-country variation in prices and the allocation of labor under autarky. We are particularly






























































(￿1￿2 (1 ￿  1) +  1￿1￿2)
^ k (48)
It is clear that, other things equal, the relative price p is larger in an economy with a higher degree of
￿nancial contractibility ￿. This is the e⁄ect isolated by our benchmark model, and it is now apparent that
it holds more generally. It is straightforward to show that, in the case symmetric productions functions, this
immediately implies that p < 1 whenever ￿nancial constraints bind. The reason for this is that as ￿ rises,
equilibrium values converge continuously to the allocations of an economy where ￿nancial constraints do not
bind, and in the latter economy we must have p = 1.
Equation (48) also shed lights on the e⁄ects of a larger aggregate capital-labor ratios on the relative price
p. In the Cobb-Douglas case we had a positive link between p and K=L. In the general case, this continues
39to be the case provided that
￿1￿2 (1 ￿ ￿2) > (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1￿2. (49)
In a frictionless economy, this condition would simply be ￿1 > ￿2, which is our assumption in the main
text. Similarly, when ￿1 = ￿2 (which is satis￿ed in our Cobb-Douglas case), the condition ￿1 > ￿2 is again
su¢ cient to ensure that p is increasing in K=L. When ￿2 is su¢ ciently low, however, it may be the case that
p is decreasing in K=L. Intuitively, when capital and labor are very complementary in sector 2, an increase
in the capital stock increases the allocation of labor to that sector almost proportionately (regardless of
factor intensities), and thus expands production in sector 2 relative to production in sector 1.31 It should be
clear, however, that even when condition (49) fails to be satis￿ed, the relative price p continues to be lower
in South whenever cross-country di⁄erences in ￿ are larger relative to cross-country di⁄erences in K=L.
We can now move to an analysis of the small open economy. Our goal here is to show that, for general
technologies and preferences, the rental rate of uninformed capital is an increasing function of p. We again
use Jones￿(1965) hat algebra approach, this time ignoring the goods-market condition and treating p as
parametric. This amounts to solving for ^ w, ^ ￿, ^ ￿, and ^  1 as a function of ^ p; ^ ￿ and ^ k. We focus here on the
value of ^ ￿ :
^ ￿ =
( 1￿1 + ￿1￿2 (1 ￿  1))
(￿1￿2 (1 ￿  1) +  1￿1￿2)
^ p ￿
( 1 ￿ ￿￿)￿1 (1 ￿ ￿2)
(￿1￿2 (1 ￿  1) +  1￿1￿2)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
^ ￿ ￿
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿2)
(￿1￿2 (1 ￿  1) +  1￿1￿2)
^ k.
Notice that the rental rate ￿ is necessarily increasing in p. This con￿rms that it is generally the case
that, provided that trade integration raises the relative price p in South, it also raises the real reward to
uninformed capital. In fact, the coe¢ cient of ^ p is strictly larger than one (for ￿2 < 1), and thus ￿=p is
also increasing in the relative price p. In words, the return to uninformed capital increases in terms of both
sectors￿output.
As discussed in the main text, this rise in ￿ (and ￿=p) is the key feature that leads to complementarity
between trade ￿ ows and capital ￿ ows in the model. Whether the increase in ￿ is large enough to lead to
￿
S > ￿
N with free trade depends again on whether relative factor endowment di⁄erences are large relative to
factor intensity di⁄erences and di⁄erences in ￿nancial contractibility. As a matter of fact, the condition that
ensures ￿
S > ￿
N is completely analogous to that in the model with Cobb-Douglas functional forms, namely:
￿
 1








1 ￿  1
￿
[ K=L > 0.
Or, more simply, all that we require is that North operates sector 2￿ s technology at a higher capital-labor
ratio than South does.
It is straightforward to show that this condition will hold in the case of symmetric (neoclassical) pro-
duction functions and no di⁄erences in K=L across countries. In such a case, the analog of equation (5)























A, for j = N;S, (50)
where FL (￿) denotes the marginal product of labor and F0
L (￿) > 0. As shown above, for general homothetic
31Our condition is closely related to Amano￿ s (1977) analysis of a proportional increase in the endowment of both
speci￿c factors in the context of the speci￿c-factors model.
40preferences and symmetric production functions, it continues to be the case that p < 1 as long as the














, and thus ￿
S > ￿
N.
Finally, note too that in the case of symmetric technologies and equal aggregate capital-labor ratios,
the last equation of the system in (47) immediately implies that wS < wN. This is because countries di⁄er
only in their ￿￿ s, and thus the sign of dw=d￿ has to be the opposite of the sign of d￿=d￿. Manipulating
the same system (47), one can also show that for the case of symmetric technologies (i.e., ￿1 = ￿2 and
￿1 = ￿2) we necessarily have that ￿
S > ￿
N (details available upon request). This completes the proof that
all the statements in Proposition 2 hold for general symmetric production technologies and no relative factor
endowment di⁄erences across countries.
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